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ASPEX	  EYEWEAR,	  INC.	  V.	  MARCHON	  EYEWEAR,	  INC.	  AND	  BRAIN	  
LIFE,	  LLC	  V.	  ELEKTA	  INC.:	  IRRECONCILABLE	  CONFLICT	  IN	  THE	  LAW	  GOVERNING	  CLAIM	  PRECLUSION	  IN	  PATENT	  CASES	  CHRISTOPHER	  PETRONI*	  ABSTRACT	  In	  1991,	  the	  Federal	  Circuit	  held	  that	  a	  judgment	  on	  the	  merits	  in	  a	  patent	  infringement	  action	  bars	  future	  claims	  based	  on	  products	  that	  are	   “essentially	   the	   same”	   as	   the	   product	   at	   issue	   in	   the	   former	   suit.	  	  This	   rule	   governed	   claim	   preclusion	   in	   patent	   actions	   until	   at	   least	  2009.	   	  Then,	   in	  2012,	  the	  Federal	  Circuit	  upended	  the	  apple	  cart	  with	  
Aspex	  Eyewear,	   Inc.	  v.	  Marchon	  Eyewear,	   Inc.,	  672	  F.3d	  1335	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2012),	  holding	  that	  a	   judgment	   in	  an	   infringement	  suit	  never	  bars	   fu-­‐ture	   claims	  against	  products	   that	   could	  not	  have	  been	  accused	   in	   the	  former	  litigation,	  essentially	  the	  same	  or	  not.	  	  The	  court	  reaffirmed	  this	  rule	   in	  2014	   in	  Brain	  Life,	   LLC	   v.	  Elekta	   Inc.,	   746	  F.3d	  1045	   (Fed.	  Cir.	  2014).	  	  The	  Federal	  Circuit	  introduced	  this	  change	  in	  the	  law	  for	  a	  good	  reason:	   the	   “essentially	   the	   same”	   rule	   had	   the	   unfortunate	   effect	   of	  granting	  an	  adjudged	  infringer	  a	  license	  to	  continue	  infringing,	  secure	  in	  the	  knowledge	  that	  claim	  preclusion	  would	  bar	  a	  second	  suit.	  	  Unfor-­‐tunately,	  Aspex	  and	  Brain	  Life	  are	  squarely	  in	  conflict	  with	  earlier	  Fed-­‐eral	  Circuit	  precedent.	  	  Because	  one	  three-­‐judge	  panel	  cannot	  overrule	  another,	  the	  “essentially	  the	  same”	  test	  remains	  the	  law.	   	  The	  en	  banc	  Federal	   Circuit	   should	   address	   this	   conflict,	   and	   resolve	   it	   in	   favor	   of	  
Aspex	  and	  Brain	  Life.	   INTRODUCTION	  If	  not	  as	  old	  as	  time,	  it’s	  a	  tale	  at	  least	  as	  old	  as	  Article	  I,	  section	  8,	  clause	  8.	   	   Inventor	   invents	   invention.	   	   Inventor	  obtains	  patent.	   	  Com-­‐petitor	   sells	   infringing	   product.	   	   Inventor	   sues	   Competitor.	   	   Inventor	  wins	   judgment	   of	   infringement	   and	   damages.	   	   This	   scenario	   is	   Con-­‐gress’s	   scheme	   for	   securing	   to	   the	   drivers	   of	   innovation	   the	   fruits	   of	  their	  labor,	  working	  as	  intended.	  The	  story	  rarely	  ends	  so	  neatly,	  however.	   	  What	  happens	  if	  Com-­‐petitor	  continues	  to	  sell	  the	  same	  infringing	  products	  after	  judgment	  of	  infringement	   is	   entered?	   	   If	   Inventor	  had	  obtained	  an	   injunction,	   one	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  might	   expect	  her	   to	   enforce	   it	   through	  a	   contempt	  action.	   	  Absent	   an	  injunction,	  perhaps	  Inventor	  would	  file	  a	  new	  infringement	  claim,	  per-­‐haps	   even	   resting	   on	   offensive	   issue	   preclusion	   to	   avoid	   the	   need	   to	  relitigate	   the	   former	  suit.	   	  Whatever	   the	  precise	  mechanism,	  any	   fair-­‐minded	  person	  would	  expect	  the	  law	  to	  provide	  Inventor	  some	  means	  of	  enforcing	  the	  judgment	  against	  continued	  acts	  of	  infringement.	  	  That	  the	  law	  would	  actively	  prevent	  Inventor	  from	  taking	  any	  action	  against	  Competitor	  would	  likely	  fall	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  a	  ranked	  list	  of	   just	  out-­‐comes.	  	  Yet,	  until	  very	  recently,	  this	  is	  exactly	  what	  the	  law	  required.	  In	   1991,	   in	   Foster	   v.	   Hallco	   Manufacturing	   Co.,	   Inc.,1	   the	   Federal	  Circuit	   held	   that	   a	   judgment	   of	   patent	   infringement	   bars	   all	   future	  claims	  of	  infringement	  of	  the	  same	  patent	  by	  products	  that	  are	  “essen-­‐tially	   the	   same”	   as	   those	   accused	   in	   the	  original	   suit.2	   	   This	   rule	  held	  even	  where	  the	  presently	  accused	  products	  were	  not	  produced	  or	  sold	  until	   after	   the	   former	   judgment	   issued	   and	   therefore	   could	   not	   have	  been	   accused	   in	   the	   former	   action.3	   	   The	   Federal	   Circuit	   upheld	   the	  “essentially	  the	  same”	  test	  in	  at	  least	  five	  subsequent	  opinions.4	  The	  Federal	  Circuit	  attempted	  to	  address	  the	  dilemma	  of	  Inventor	  and	  Competitor	  in	  March	  of	  2012,	  when	  a	  three-­‐judge	  panel	  issued	  its	  opinion	   in	   Aspex	   Eyewear,	   Inc.	   v.	   Marchon	   Eyewear,	   Inc.5	   	   There,	   the	  court	  held	   that	  a	   judgment	  of	   infringement	  never	  bars	  a	   later	  accusa-­‐tion	   against	   a	  product	   that	  was	  not	  produced	  or	   sold	  when	   the	   judg-­‐ment	  was	  issued.6	  	  The	  court	  made	  clear	  that	  whether	  the	  products	  at	  issue	  in	  the	  second	  action	  are	  “essentially	  the	  same”	  as	  those	  accused	  in	  the	  former	  one	  “does	  not	  matter”	  if	  the	  later	  products	  did	  not	  exist	  while	   the	   former	   action	  was	   pending.7	   	   To	   hold	   otherwise,	   the	   court	  reasoned,	   would	   in	   many	   cases	   amount	   to	   granting	   an	   adjudged	   in-­‐fringer	  “an	  unpaid	  license	  for	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  life	  of	  the	  patent.”8	  Today,	  Inventor’s	  second	  suit	  against	  Competitor	  would	  require	  a	  district	  court	  to	  resolve	  two	  contradictory	  lines	  of	  authority.	  	  Through	  	  	   *	   J.D.,	  summa	  cum	  laude,	  University	  of	  California,	  Hastings	  College	  of	  the	  Law,	  San	  Francis-­‐co,	  CA.	  	   1.	   	  947	  F.2d	  469	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  1991).	  	   2.	   	  Id.	  at	  479–80.	  	   3.	   	  See	  id.	  at	  472–23,	  480	  (holding	  that	  a	  second	  suit	  would	  be	  barred	  even	  as	  against	  prod-­‐ucts	  not	  produced	  or	  sold	  until	  four	  years	  after	  the	  prior	  judgment	  was	  rendered).	  	   4.	   	  Nystrom	  v.	  Trex	  Co.,	   Inc.,	  580	  F.3d	  1281,	  1285	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2009);	  Roche	  Palo	  Alto	  LLC	  v.	  Apotex,	   Inc.,	  531	  F.3d	  1372,	  1379–80	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2008);	  Acumed	  v.	  Stryker	  Corp.,	  525	  F.3d	  1319,	  1324	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2008);	  Ecolab,	  Inc.	  v.	  Paraclipse,	  Inc.,	  285	  F.3d	  1362,	  1376	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2002);	  Hallco	  Mfg.	  Co.,	  Inc.	  v.	  Foster,	  256	  F.3d	  1290,	  1295–96	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2001).	  	   5.	   	  672	  F.3d	  1335	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2012).	  	   6.	   	  Id.	  at	  1342.	  	   7.	   	  Id.	  	   8.	   	  Id.	  at	  1344.	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  at	   least	  2009,	   the	  Federal	  Circuit	   held	   and	   reaffirmed	   that	   successive	  claims	  of	   infringement	  of	  a	  patent	  are	  barred	  if	  the	  presently	  and	  for-­‐merly	  accused	  products	  are	  “essentially	  the	  same.”	  	  In	  Aspex	  (and	  again	  in	   a	   three-­‐judge	   panel	   opinion	   in	  Brain	   Life,	   LLC	   v.	   Elekta	   Inc.9),	   	   the	  court	   held	   to	   the	   contrary	   that	   a	   suit	   against	   a	   product	   that	  was	   not	  made	  or	  sold	  as	  of	  the	  former	  judgment	  is	  never	  barred,	  whether	  “es-­‐sentially	   the	   same”	   as	   the	   formerly	   accused	  product	   or	   not.	   	   Because	  one	   three-­‐judge	   panel	   cannot	   overrule	   another,10	   this	   dilemma	   has	  only	  one	  solution:	  as	  the	  earlier	  precedent,	  Foster	  and	  its	  progeny	  con-­‐trol.	   	   Though	   Inventor	   successfully	   accused	   Competitor’s	   products	   of	  infringement	  in	  the	  first	  action,	  unless	  it	  obtained	  an	  injunction,	  claim	  preclusion	   bars	   a	   later	   claim	   against	   that	   infringing	   product	   even	   if	  Competitor’s	   infringing	  sales	  continue.	   	  At	   least	  one	  district	  court	  has	  resolved	  the	  conflict	  between	  Foster	  and	  Aspex/Brain	  Life	  in	  this	  man-­‐ner.11	  This	  Comment	  will	   argue	   that	   the	   conclusion	   the	   law	   requires	   is	  not	   the	   result	   that	   sound	  policy	   dictates.	   	   The	   rule	   set	   forth	   in	  Aspex	  and	  Brain	  Life	  is	  preferable	  to	  the	  “essentially	  the	  same”	  test	  because	  it	  prevents	  a	  party	  to	  a	  judgment	  of	  infringement	  from	  gaining	  immunity	  from	   future	   infringement	   accusations.	   	   However,	   because	   Aspex	   and	  
Brain	  Life	  are	  incompatible	  with	  Foster,	  the	  earlier	  precedent	  controls.	  	  Until	  the	  Federal	  Circuit	  endorses	  Aspex	  and	  Brain	  Life	  en	  banc,	  district	  courts	  are	  bound	  to	  apply	  the	  “essentially	  the	  same”	  test,	  even	  where	  a	  judgment	   of	   infringement	   leaves	   an	   alleged	   infringer	   free	   to	   practice	  the	  patent	  unchallenged.	  Part	   I	   of	   this	   Comment	   exposes	   the	   conflict	   between	   Aspex	   and	  
Brain	  Life	  and	  the	  Foster	  line	  of	  cases.	  	  Part	  II	  examines	  and	  dismisses	  the	  Aspex	  and	  Brain	  Life	  courts’	  attempts	  to	  distinguish	  Foster.	  	  Finally,	  Part	   III	   argues	   that	   the	  Aspex/Brain	   Life	   rule	   leads	   to	  more	   just	   out-­‐comes	   than	   the	  Foster	   rule,	   and	   urges	   the	   en	   banc	   Federal	   Circuit	   to	  overrule	  Foster	  accordingly.	  
	  	   9.	   	  746	  F.3d	  1045,	  1054	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2014).	  	   10.	   	  Newell	  Cos.,	  Inc.	  v.	  Kenny	  Mfg.	  Co.,	  864	  F.2d	  757,	  765	  (Fed.	  Cir.1988).	  	   11.	   	  Mentor	  Graphics	  Corp.	  v.	  EVE-­‐USA,	  Inc.,	  No.	  10-­‐954,	  2014	  WL	  2533336,	  at	  *1	  (D.	  Or.	  June	  4,	  2014).	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  FEDERAL	  CIRCUIT’S	  ATTEMPT	  TO	  REIN	  IN	  THE	  “ESSENTIALLY	  THE	  SAME”	  TEST	  Courts	  have	  moved	  away	   from	  the	   legal	  Latin	  of	   “res	   judicata”	   in	  favor	  of	  the	  modern	  terms	  “claim	  preclusion”	  and	  “issue	  preclusion.”12	  	  Claim	  preclusion	  bars	  a	  plaintiff	  from	  suing	  a	  defendant	  on	  a	  claim	  on	  which	  she	  already	  obtained	  a	  final	  judgment	  on	  the	  merits	  against	  that	  defendant.13	   	   Issue	   preclusion,	   by	   contrast,	   bars	   relitigation	   of	   issues	  that	  were	  actually	  litigated	  in	  the	  prior	  action,	  even	  if	  raised	  as	  part	  of	  a	  different	  claim.14	   	  Though	  the	  Federal	  Circuit	   looks	  to	  the	  law	  of	  the	  appropriate	  regional	  circuit	  for	  the	  general	  principles	  of	  claim	  preclu-­‐sion,	   Federal	   Circuit	   law	   governs	   whether	   two	   patent	   infringement	  claims	  are	  the	  “same”	  claim	  for	  preclusion	  purposes.15	  In	   Foster,	   the	   Federal	   Circuit	   held	   that	   successive	   infringement	  claims	  are	  the	  “same”	  claim	  if	  the	  accused	  products	  in	  the	  present	  and	  former	   actions	   are	   “essentially	   the	   same.”16	   	   There,	   Hallco	   accused	  Raymond	  Foster	  and	  two	  business	  entities	  of	  infringing	  two	  patents	  for	  conveyor	   systems	   to	   be	   used	   in	   truck	   beds.17	   	   The	   parties	   reached	   a	  settlement	   agreement	   under	  which	   Foster	   agreed	   to	   pay	   royalties	   to	  Hallco	   in	  exchange	  for	  a	   license,	  and	  disposed	  of	   the	  action	  through	  a	  consent	   judgment.18	   	  Four	  years	   later,	  Foster	  developed	  and	  sold	  new	  conveyor	   models,	   and	   Hallco	   demanded	   royalties	   under	   the	   license	  agreement.19	   	  Foster	  filed	  suit,	  seeking	  a	  declaration	  that	   its	  new	  con-­‐veyors	  did	  not	  infringe	  Hallco’s	  patents.20	  	  In	  response,	  Hallco	  asserted	  that	  Foster’s	  claim	  was	  barred	  under	  the	  doctrine	  of	  res	  judicata.21	  
	  	   12.	   	  See	   Foster	  v.	  Hallco	  Mfg.	  Co.	   Inc.,	   947	  F.2d	  469,	  478	   (Fed.	  Cir.	  1991)	   (citing	  Haphey	  v.	  Linn	  Cnty.,	  924	  F.2d	  1512,	  1515	  (9th	  Cir.	  1991)).	  	   13.	   	  In	  the	  Ninth	  Circuit,	  for	  example,	  claim	  preclusion	  bars	  a	  subsequent	  action	  where	  “(1)	  the	   same	   parties,	   or	   their	   privies,	   were	   involved	   in	   the	   prior	   litigation,	   (2)	   the	   prior	   litigation	  involved	  the	  same	  claim	  or	  cause	  of	  action	  as	  the	  later	  suit,	  and	  (3)	  the	  prior	  litigation	  was	  termi-­‐nated	  by	  a	  final	  judgment	  on	  the	  merits.”	  Cent.	  Delta	  Water	  Agency	  v.	  United	  States,	  306	  F.3d	  938,	  952	   (9th	   Cir.	   2002)	   (citing	   Blonder-­‐Tongue	   Labs.	   v.	   Univ.	   of	   Ill.	   Found.,	   402	   U.S.	   313,	   323–24	  (1971)).	  	   14.	   	  Young	   Eng’rs.,	   Inc.	   v.	   U.S.	   Int’l	   Trade	   Comm’n,	   721	   F.2d	   1305,	   1314	   (Fed.	   Cir.	   1983).	  	  “When	  an	  issue	  of	  fact	  or	  law	  is	  actually	  litigated	  and	  determined	  by	  a	  valid	  and	  final	   judgment,	  and	   the	  determination	   is	   essential	   to	   the	   judgment,	   the	  determination	   is	   conclusive	   in	   a	   subse-­‐quent	   action	   between	   the	   parties,	   whether	   on	   the	   same	   or	   a	   different	   claim.”	   	   RESTATEMENT	  (SECOND)	  OF	  JUDGMENTS	  §	  27	  (1982).	  	   15.	   	  Acumed	  LLC	  v.	  Stryker	  Corp.,	  525	  F.3d	  1319,	  1323	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2008).	  	   16.	   	  Foster,	  947	  F.2d	  at	  479–80.	  	   17.	   	  Id.	  at	  472.	  	   18.	   	  Id.	  	   19.	   	  Id.	  at	  472–73.	  	   20.	   	  Id.	  at	  473.	  	   21.	   	  Id.	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  Because	   “[a]n	  essential	   fact	  of	   a	  patent	   infringement	   claim	   is	   the	  structure	  of	  the	  device	  or	  devices	  in	  issue,”	  the	  Federal	  Circuit	  held	  that	  claim	  preclusion	  bars	   a	   subsequent	   action	  on	   the	   same	  patent	  where	  “the	  devices	  in	  the	  two	  suits	  [are]	  essentially	  the	  same.”22	  	  Conversely,	  where	   the	   products	   in	   the	   two	   suits	   are	   “materially	   different”	   in	   a	  manner	  related	  to	   the	   limitations	  of	   the	  contested	  patent	  claim,	  claim	  preclusion	   does	   not	   bar	   the	   later	   infringement	   claim.23	   	   Accordingly,	  the	   Federal	   Circuit	   remanded	   the	   case	  with	   instructions	   that	   the	   dis-­‐trict	  court	  determine	  whether	  the	  later	  accused	  conveyors	  were	  essen-­‐tially	  the	  same	  as	  the	  former	  ones.24	  The	  Federal	  Circuit	  reaffirmed	  this	  “essentially	  the	  same”	  test	  in	  cases	  spanning	  two	  decades.25	  In	  Aspex	  Eyewear,	  Inc.	  v.	  Marchon	  Eyewear,	  Inc.,26	  the	  Federal	  Cir-­‐cuit	  departed	  from	  the	  Foster	   line	  and	  held	  that	  claim	  preclusion	  bars	  infringement	   claims	   against	   only	   those	   products	   that	   were	   made	   or	  sold	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   original	   judgment,	   “essentially	   the	   same”	   or	  not.27	   	  In	  2002,	  Aspex	  sued	  Revolution	  Eyewear,	  Inc.,	  for	  infringement	  of	  a	  patent	  directed	  to	  eyeglass	  frames	  to	  which	  sunglass	  lenses	  could	  be	   temporarily	   affixed	   magnetically.28	   	   The	   court	   granted	   summary	  judgment	  in	  favor	  of	  Aspex	  on	  the	  infringement	  claim,	  and	  Aspex	  won	  a	  large	   damages	   award	   at	   trial.29	   	   Later,	   in	   2006,	   Aspex	   sued	  Marchon	  Eyewear,	   a	   licensee	   of	  Revolution’s,	   for	   infringement	   of	   the	   same	  pa-­‐tent.30	   	   In	   2008,	   that	   action	   ended	   in	   a	   settlement	   agreement	   under	  which	  Marchon	  agreed	  to	  discontinue	  the	  allegedly	  infringing	  eyeglass	  design.31	   	  Aspex	   filed	  suit	  against	  both	  Revolution	  and	  Marchon	  again	  in	  2009,	  alleging	  that	  both	  companies	  had	  begun	  to	  market	  a	  new	  eye-­‐glass	  design	  that	  infringed	  the	  patent	  at	  issue	  in	  the	  earlier	  actions.32	  The	   Southern	   District	   of	   Florida	   dismissed	   the	   action	   on	   claim	  preclusion	  grounds.33	  	  Because	  the	  new	  eyeglass	  design	  was	  “essential-­‐ly	  the	  same”	  as	  the	  design	  accused	  in	  the	  prior	  two	  suits,	  the	  infringe-­‐	  	   22.	   	  Id.	  at	  479–80.	  	   23.	   	  Id.	  at	  480.	  	   24.	   	  Id.	  at	  480,	  483.	  	   25.	   	  Nystrom	  v.	  Trex	  Co.,	   Inc.,	  580	  F.3d	  1281,	  1285	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2009);	  Roche	  Palo	  Alto	  LLC	  v.	  Apotex,	   Inc.,	  531	  F.3d	  1372,	  1379–80	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2008);	  Acumed	  v.	  Stryker	  Corp.,	  525	  F.3d	  1319,	  1324	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2008);	  Ecolab,	  Inc.	  v.	  Paraclipse,	  Inc.,	  285	  F.3d	  1362,	  1376	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2002);	  Hallco	  Mfg.	  Co.,	  Inc.	  v.	  Foster,	  256	  F.3d	  1290,	  1295–96	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2001).	  	   26.	   	  672	  F.3d	  1335	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2012).	  	   27.	   	  Id.	  at	  1342.	  	   28.	   	  Id.	  at	  1338.	  	   29.	   	  Id.	  at	  1338–39.	  	   30.	   	  Id.	  at	  1339.	  	   31.	   	  Id.	  	   32.	   	  Id.	  at	  1340.	  	   33.	   	  Id.	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  ment	   claims	   in	   all	   three	   cases	   “relate[d]	   to	   the	   same	   set	   of	   transac-­‐tions.”34	   	   That	   the	   eyeglasses	   in	   the	   2009	   action	  may	   not	   have	   been	  produced	   and	   sold	   until	   after	   the	   2002	   and	  2006	   actions	   did	   not	   ap-­‐pear	  to	  trouble	  the	  district	  court.35	  A	  three-­‐judge	  panel	  of	  the	  Federal	  Circuit	  reversed.36	  	  It	  held	  that	  claim	  preclusion	  does	  not	  bar	  an	  infringement	  action	  against	  a	  product	  that	  did	  not	  exist	  during	  the	  earlier	  litigation.37	  	  Whether	  the	  products	  at	   issue	   in	   the	   present	   and	   former	   suits	   are	   “essentially	   the	   same,”	  then,	  “does	  not	  matter	  with	  respect	  to	  products	  that	  were	  made	  or	  sold	  after	  the	  time	  of	  the	  previous	  lawsuits.”38	  	  To	  hold	  otherwise,	  to	  allow	  an	  adjudged	  infringer	  to	  continue	  to	  produce	  and	  market	  new	  infring-­‐ing	  products	  and	  hide	  behind	  claim	  preclusion	  when	  challenged,	  would	  “effectively	  giv[e]	  the	  infringer	  an	  unpaid	  license	  for	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  life	  of	  the	  patent.”39	  In	  Brain	   Life,	   LLC	   v.	   Elekta	   Inc.,40	   a	   three-­‐judge	   panel	   reaffirmed	  the	  Aspex	   rule	  and	  suggested	  how	  it	  should	   interact	  with	  Foster’s	   “es-­‐sentially	  the	  same”	  test.41	   	   In	  1997,	  Medical	   Instrumentation	  Diagnos-­‐tics	  Corporation,	  or	  MIDCO,	  accused	  Elekta,	  Inc.,	  of	  infringing	  a	  patent	  for	  a	  device	  that	  combines	  various	  types	  of	  medical	  images	  into	  a	  sin-­‐gle	  video	  presentation.42	   	  The	  Federal	  Circuit	  vacated	  a	  jury	  verdict	  in	  MIDCO’s	   favor	  and	  directed	   that	   judgment	  of	  noninfringement	  be	  en-­‐tered	  for	  Elekta.43	  	  In	  2009,	  Brain	  Life,	  LLC,	  obtained	  a	  license	  to	  prac-­‐tice	  MIDCO’s	  patent.44	  	  It	  filed	  suit	  against	  Elekta,	  accusing	  many	  of	  the	  same	  products	  at	   issue	   in	   the	  MIDCO	  suit	  and	  one	  new	  product	  of	   in-­‐fringement.45	   	   As	   in	   Aspex,	   the	   trial	   court	   held	   that	   claim	   preclusion	  barred	  Brain	  Life’s	  infringement	  claims	  in	  their	  entirety	  because	  all	  the	  accused	  products	  were	  “essentially	  the	  same”	  as	  those	  in	  MIDCO’s	  ac-­‐tion.46	  
	  	   34.	   	  Id.	  	   35.	   	  See	   id.	   at	   1342	   (Revolution	   and	  Marchon	   revealed	   at	   oral	   argument	   that	   some	   of	   the	  accused	  eyeglass	  designs	  were	  produced	  after	   the	  2002	  and	  2006	  actions	  concluded,	   “and	   thus	  were	  not	  in	  existence	  at	  the	  time	  of	  that	  earlier	  litigation.”).	  	   36.	   	  Id.	  at	  1337,	  1350.	  	   37.	   	  Id.	  at	  1342.	  	   38.	   	  Id.	  	   39.	   	  Id.	  at	  1344.	  	   40.	   	  746	  F.3d	  1045	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2014).	  	   41.	   	  Id.	  at	  1053–54.	  	   42.	   	  Id.	  at	  1049.	  	   43.	   	  Id.	  at	  1050.	  	   44.	   	  Id.	  	   45.	   	  Id.	  at	  1050–51.	  	   46.	   	  Id.	  at	  1051.	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  The	  Federal	  Circuit	  vacated	  this	  portion	  of	  the	  trial	  court’s	  opinion	  as	   it	   concerned	   acts	   of	   infringement	   that	   occurred	   after	   the	   prior	  judgment	  was	   entered.47	   	   It	   reiterated	   the	  Aspex	   court’s	   holding	   that	  claim	  preclusion	  does	  not	  bar	  an	  accusation	  of	   infringement	  against	  a	  product	   that	   was	   not	   produced	   or	   sold	   as	   of	   the	   prior	   infringement	  action.48	   	   It	   also	   restated	   the	  Foster	   holding	   that	   claim	  preclusion	  ap-­‐plies	  only	  where	   the	  accused	  product	   is	   “essentially	   the	   same”	  as	   the	  product	  accused	   in	   the	  earlier	   litigation.49	   In	   the	  Aspex-­‐Brain	  Life	  uni-­‐verse,	  then,	  claim	  preclusion	  bars	  successive	  suits	  based	  on	  sales	  of	  the	  accused	  product	  and	  of	  any	  products	  that	  are	  “essentially	  the	  same”	  as	  of	  the	  former	  judgment,	  but	  in	  no	  event	  prevents	  a	  later	  infringement	  claim	  against	  a	  product	   that	  was	  made	  or	  sold	  after	   the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  former	  suit.	  Interestingly,	  the	  fairness	  concern	  that	  troubled	  the	  Aspex	  court	  is	  missing	   in	  Brain	  Life.	   	  Where	   the	  prior	  action	  ended	   in	  a	   judgment	  of	  noninfringement,	   Foster’s	   “essentially	   the	   same”	   test	   grants	   the	   pre-­‐vailing	  party	  the	  right	  to	  continue	  to	  produce	  its	  products	  without	  be-­‐ing	  disturbed	  by	  successive	  accusations	  of	   infringement.	   	   In	  excepting	  new	  product	   sales	   from	   that	   test,	   the	  Aspex	   rule	   exposes	   a	  prevailing	  defendant	   to	  a	  risk	  of	  expensive	  successive	   litigation	  every	  time	   it	   in-­‐troduces	   new	  products,	   no	  matter	   how	   similar	   they	   are	   to	   a	   product	  already	   judged	   not	   to	   infringe	   the	   patent.	   	   Perhaps	   recognizing	   this	  weakness	   of	   the	   Aspex	   rule,	   the	   Brain	   Life	   court	   found	   Brain	   Life’s	  claims	  against	   several	  of	  Elekta’s	  products	  barred	  by	   the	  Kessler	   doc-­‐trine.50	  
Foster	   and	   its	   progeny	   held	   that	   successive	   infringement	   claims	  are	   barred	   if	   the	   successively	   accused	   products	   are	   essentially	   the	  	  	   47.	   	  Id.	  at	  1055,	  1059.	  	   48.	   	  Id.	  at	  1054.	  	   49.	   	  Id.	  at	  1053.	  	   50.	   	  Over	  one	  hundred	  years	   ago,	   the	   Supreme	  Court	  held	   that	   a	   judgment	  of	   noninfringe-­‐ment	   in	   one	   action	   bars	   a	   future	   action	   alleging	   infringement	   of	   the	   same	   patent	   by	   the	   same	  product.	  	  Kessler	  v.	  Eldred,	  206	  U.S.	  285,	  289–90	  (1907).	  	  The	  prior	  judgment	  of	  noninfringement	  “settled	  finally	  and	  everywhere”	  that	  the	  defendant	  in	  the	  prior	  action	  “had	  the	  right	  to	  manufac-­‐ture,	  use,	  and	  sell”	  the	  accused	  product.	   	  Id.	  at	  288.	   	  Later	  courts	  read	  Kessler	   to	  establish	  that	  a	  party	  that	  wins	  a	  judgment	  of	  noninfringement	  enjoys	  “a	  limited	  trade	  right	  which	  is	  ‘the	  right	  to	  have	   that	  which	   [a	   court	   has	   determined]	   it	   lawfully	   produces	   freely	   bought	   and	   sold	  without	  restraint	   or	   interference.’”	   	  MGA,	   Inc.	   v.	   Gen.	  Motors	   Corp.,	   827	   F.2d	   729,	   734	   (Fed.	   Cir.	   1987)	  (quoting	   Rubber	   Tire	  Wheel	   Co.	   v.	   Goodyear	   Tire	   &	   Rubber	   Co.,	   232	   U.S.	   413,	   418–19	   (1914)	  (alteration	  in	  original)).	  	  In	  Brain	  Life,	  the	  Federal	  Circuit	  applied	  the	  Kessler	  holding	  to	  the	  Elekta	  products	  that	  did	  not	  exist	  as	  of	   the	  prior	   judgment,	   independently	  of	   the	  claim	  preclusion	  doc-­‐trine.	   	  Brain	  Life,	   LLC	  v.	  Elekta	   Inc.,746	  F.3d	  1045,	  1058–59	   (Fed.	  Cir.	   2014).	   	   It	   noted	   that	   the	  parties	  did	  not	  dispute	  that	  several	  of	  the	  products	  at	  issue	  in	  the	  later	  case	  were	  not	  materially	  different	  in	  any	  respect	  from	  those	  at	  issue	  in	  the	  action	  ending	  in	  a	  judgment	  of	  noninfringement,	  and	  held	  that	  the	  Kessler	  doctrine	  barred	  infringement	  claims	  against	  those	  products.	  	  Id.	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  and	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  Life	  held	  that	  infringement	  claims	  against	  prod-­‐ucts	  that	  were	  not	  made	  or	  sold	  until	  after	  the	  previous	  action	  are	  not	  barred,	   essentially	   the	   same	   or	   not.	   	   The	   conflict	   between	   the	   two	   is	  apparent.	  	  Because	  one	  three-­‐judge	  panel	  may	  not	  overrule	  the	  opinion	  of	   another,51	   unless	   Aspex	   and	   Brain	   Life	   can	   be	   reconciled	   with	   the	  opinions	  that	  came	  before	  them,	  the	  Foster	  line	  controls.	  II.	  FOSTER	  AND	  ASPEX	  ARE	  IRRECONCILABLE,	  LEAVING	  FOSTER	  IN	  CONTROL	  The	  Aspex	  and	  Brain	  Life	  opinions	  suggest	  three	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  conflict	  with	   the	  Foster	   line	   of	   cases	  might	   be	   reasoned	   away.	   	   First,	  perhaps	   the	   Aspex	   rule	   follows	   necessarily	   from	   ancient	   res	   judicata	  principles	   with	   which	   Foster	   is	   at	   odds.	   	   Second,	   perhaps	   courts	   in	  practice	   applied	   the	   “essentially	   the	   same”	   test	   only	   to	   products	   al-­‐ready	   in	   existence	   during	   the	   pendency	   of	   the	   former	   action.	   	   Third,	  though	   Foster	   expressly	   set	   forth	   a	   claim	   preclusion	   doctrine,	   subse-­‐quent	   courts	   applying	   the	   “essentially	   the	   same”	   test	  may	   in	   practice	  have	   performed	   an	   analysis	  more	   akin	   to	   issue	   preclusion.	   	   The	   first	  two	   suggestions	   may	   be	   readily	   dispensed	   with,	   as	   they	   cannot	   be	  squared	  with	  the	  Foster	  opinion	  itself.	  	  The	  third	  requires	  a	  more	  thor-­‐ough	  exploration	  of	  the	  Federal	  Circuit’s	  application	  of	  the	  “essentially	  the	   same”	   test	   from	   1991	   to	   the	   present.	   	   Ultimately,	   it	   too	   finds	   no	  support	  in	  the	  case	  law.	  
A.	  Did	  the	  Aspex/Brain	  Life	  Rule	  Flow	  Inevitably	  from	  Common-­‐
Law	  Principles	  Regarding	  the	  Preclusive	  Effect	  of	  Judgments?	  The	  Aspex	  court	  observed	  that,	  “[u]nder	  well-­‐settled	  principles,”	  a	  plaintiff	  who	  has	  won	  a	  judgment	  against	  a	  defendant	  is	  ordinarily	  not	  barred	   from	   seeking	   relief	   for	   the	   defendant’s	   subsequent	   wrongful	  conduct.52	   	   To	   this	   effect,	   the	   court	   cited	   the	   Supreme	   Court’s	   mid-­‐twentieth	  century	  opinion	  in	  Lawlor	  v.	  National	  Screen	  Service	  Corpora-­‐
tion.53	  	  There,	  the	  high	  court	  held	  that,	  “[w]hile	  [a]	  judgment	  precludes	  recovery	  on	  claims	  arising	  prior	  to	  its	  entry,	  it	  cannot	  be	  given	  the	  ef-­‐fect	   of	   extinguishing	   claims	  which	  did	   not	   even	   then	   exist	   and	  which	  could	  not	  possibly	  have	  been	  sued	  upon	   in	   the	  previous	  case.”54	   	  The	  
Aspex	  court	  also	  cited	  a	  string	  of	  opinions	   in	  the	  courts	  of	  appeals	   for	  
	  	   51.	   	  Newell	  Cos.,	  Inc.	  v.	  Kenny	  Mfg.	  Co.,	  864	  F.2d	  757,	  765	  (Fed.Cir.1988).	  	   52.	   	  Aspex	  Eyewear,	  Inc.	  v.	  Marchon	  Eyewear	  672	  F.3d	  1335,	  1342	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2012).	  	   53.	   	  349	  U.S.	  322	  (1955);	  Aspex,	  672	  F.3d	  at	  1342–43.	  	   54.	   	  Lawlor	  v.	  Nat’l	  Screen	  Serv.	  Corp.,	  349	  U.S.	  322,	  328	  (1955).	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  the	   same	   proposition,	   most	   of	   which	   predated	   Foster.55	   	   Finally,	   the	  Federal	   Circuit	   invoked	   the	   two	  great	   treatises	   on	   federal	   procedure:	  Wright	  &	  Miller’s	  Federal	  Practice	  and	  Procedure	   and	  Moore’s	  Federal	  
Practice.56	   	   In	  Brain	  Life,	   as	   it	   reaffirmed	   the	  Aspex	   holding,	   the	   court	  briefly	  retreaded	  Lawlor	  and	  the	  same	  string	  of	  federal	  appellate	  opin-­‐ions.57	  Perhaps	   to	   head	   off	   the	   suggestion	   that	   issues	   unique	   to	   patent	  law	  call	  for	  diverging	  from	  the	  common-­‐law	  rule,	  the	  Aspex	  court	  went	  on	  to	  cite	  patent	  cases	  in	  which	  claims	  that	  could	  have	  been	  raised	  in	  a	  prior	  suit	  were	  held	  barred	  in	  a	  subsequent	  one.58	   	   It	  quoted	  an	  early	  1980s	   Federal	   Circuit	   case,	  Young	   Engineers,	   Inc.	   v.	   U.S.	   International	  
Trade	   Commission,59	   as	   rejecting	   the	   notion	   that	   “an	   ‘infringement	  claim,’	   for	  purposes	  of	  claim	  preclusion,	  embraces	  more	  than	  the	  spe-­‐cific	  devices	  before	  the	  court	  in	  the	  first	  suit.”60	   	  The	  court	  went	  on	  to	  cite	  three	  district	  court	  opinions	  declining	  to	  apply	  claim	  preclusion	  to	  infringement	  claims	  against	  products	  that	  could	  not	  have	  been	  accused	  in	  the	  first	  suit.61	  	  In	  reaffirming	  Aspex,	  the	  Brain	  Life	  court	  quoted	  the	  	  	   55.	   	  Aspex,	  672	  F.3d	  at	  1343.	  	  See	  Manning	  v.	  City	  of	  Auburn,	  953	  F.2d	  1355,	  1359	  (11th	  Cir.	  1992)	  (holding	  that	  dismissal	  of	  a	  race	  discrimination	  class	  action	  did	  not	  prevent	  a	  passive	  class	  member	  from	  suing	  on	  subsequent	  discriminatory	  acts);	  Blair	  v.	  City	  of	  Greenville,	  649	  F.2d	  365,	  368	  (5th	  Cir.	  1981)	  (holding	  that	  a	  consent	  decree	  in	  a	  former	  race	  discrimination	  class	  action	  did	  not	   bar	   the	   class	   from	  asserting	   claims	  based	   on	   subsequent	   acts	   of	   discrimination);	  Kilgoar	   v.	  Colbert	  Cnty.	  Bd.	  of	  Educ.,	  578	  F.2d	  1033,	  1034–35	  (5th	  Cir.	  1978)	  (holding	  that	   judgment	  on	  a	  prior	  action	  against	  the	  school	  board	  for	  wrongful	  failure	  to	  rehire	  the	  plaintiffs	  did	  not	  bar	  action	  on	   the	   school	   board’s	   subsequent	   refusal	   to	   adopt	   the	   superintendent’s	   recommendation	   that	  plaintiffs	  be	  rehired).	  	   56.	   	  Aspex,	   672	  F.3d	   at	   1343	   (citing	  18	  Charles	  Alan	  Wright,	  Arthur	  R.	  Miller	  &	  Edward	  H.	  Cooper,	   FEDERAL	   PRACTICE	   &	   PROCEDURE	   §	  4409	   (2002);	   18	   James	   W.	   Moore,	   MOORE’S	   FEDERAL	  PRACTICE	  §	  131.23[3][c]	  (2011)).	  	   57.	   	  Brain	  Life,	  LLC	  v.	  Elekta	  Inc.,746	  F.3d	  1045,	  1055	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2014).	  	   58.	   	  Aspex	  672	  F.3d	  at	  1343.	  	   59.	   	  721	  F.2d	  1305	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  1983)	  	   60.	   	  Aspex,	  672	  F.3d	  at	  1343	  (quoting	  Young	  Eng’rs.,	  721	  F.3d	  at	  1316).	  	   61.	   	  Id.	  	  See	  also	  Cordis	  Corp.	  v.	  Boston	  Sci.	  Corp.,	  635	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  361,	  369–70	  (D.	  Del.	  2009)	  (holding	   that	   claim	   preclusion	   did	   not	   bar	   a	   subsequent	   infringement	   action	   against	   post-­‐judgment	   sales	  of	   the	   same	  product	   at	   issue	   in	   the	   former	   suit);	  Williams	  v.	  Gillette	  Co.,	   887	  F.	  Supp.	   181,	   184	   (N.D.	   Ill.	   1995)	   (holding	   that	   claim	   preclusion	   does	   not	   bar	   suits	   for	   damages	  based	  on	  post-­‐judgment	   infringing	  acts,	   even	  against	   an	   identical	  product);	  MGA,	   Inc.	   v.	   Centri-­‐Spay	  Corp.,	  699	  F.	  Supp.	  610,	  614	  (E.D.	  Mich.	  1987)	  (“if	  the	  plaintiff	  claimed	  that	  different	  prod-­‐ucts	  infringed	  the	  patent	  in	  suit,	  the	  prior	  adjudication	  would	  not	  act	  as	  a	  bar	  to	  the	  subsequent	  claim”).	   	  In	  Cordis,	  the	  court	  acknowledged	  early	  in	  the	  opinion	  that	  “[t]wo	  infringement	  ‘claims’	  are	  considered	  the	  ‘same	  claim’	  if	  the	  accused	  products	  in	  the	  two	  suits	  are	  ‘essentially	  the	  same,’”	  but	  failed	  to	  apply	  this	  principle	  when	  analyzing	  whether	  claim	  preclusion	  applied.	  	  635	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	   at	   366,	   369–70.	   	   The	  Williams	   court	   reasoned	   that	   the	   Foster	   rule	   applied	   only	   to	   consent	  decrees.	   	   887	  F.	   Supp.	   at	   185.	   	  As	   the	  opinion	   issued	   in	  1995,	   before	   the	  Federal	  Circuit	   estab-­‐lished	  more	  firmly	   in	  cases	   like	  Roche	  Palo	  Alto	  and	  Acumed	   that	  the	  “essentially	  the	  same”	  test	  applies	  to	  defenses	  of	  claim	  preclusion	  generally,	  this	  was	  a	  plausible	  position	  to	  take.	  	  See	  Roche	  Palo	  Alto	  LLC	  v.	  Apotex,	  Inc.,	  531	  F.3d	  1372,	  1379–80	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2008)	  (applying	  the	  “essentially	  the	  same”	  test	  where	  the	  first	  litigation	  ended	  in	  a	  bench	  trial);	  Acumed	  LLC	  v.	  Stryker	  Corp.,	  525	  F.3d	  1319,	  1324	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2008)	  (applying	  Foster	  where	  the	  prior	  suit	  ended	  in	  a	  jury	  verdict).	  	  In	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  same	  passage	   from	  Young	  Engineers	   and	  cited	   the	   same	  string	  of	  dis-­‐trict	   court	   opinions.62	   	   The	  Aspex	   and	  Brain	   Life	   courts	   appear	  not	   to	  have	  thought	  that	  unique	  patent	  law	  considerations	  required	  variation	  from	   the	  principle	   that	   a	   judgment	   cuts	  off	   all	   claims	   that	   could	  have	  been	  asserted	  before	  it	  was	  rendered.	  The	  implication	  is	  unstated	  but	  unmistakable:	  the	  Aspex/Brain	  Life	  rule	   is	   a	   natural	   outgrowth	   of	   an	   ancient	   common-­‐law	   res	   judicata	  principle,	  solidified	  in	  Supreme	  Court	  and	  early63	  Federal	  Circuit	  prec-­‐edent.	   	  The	  Foster	   rule,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  with	   its	  allowance	  for	  pre-­‐clusion	  of	  claims	  that	  did	  not	  exist	  until	  after	  the	  prior	  judgment,	  is	  an	  illegitimate	   departure	   from	   that	   august	   principle.	   	   The	   argument	   is	  superficially	  plausible.	  	  If	  Foster	  ran	  counter	  to	  settled	  law	  when	  it	  was	  decided,	  then	  Aspex	  and	  Brain	  Life	  did	  not	  attempt	  to	  depart	  from	  valid	  precedent	  but	  merely	  corrected	  an	  error.	   	  Unfortunately	   for	   this	  neat	  hypothesis,	  Foster’s	  “essentially	  the	  same”	  test	  is	  not	  at	  odds	  with	  Law-­‐
lor	  and	  the	  other	  cases	  that	  Aspex	  and	  Brain	  Life	  cited.	  	  Instead,	  the	  two	  lines	  of	  authority	  answer	  different	  questions.	  
Lawlor	   teaches	   that	   judgment	   on	   a	   claim	   does	   not	   bar	   future	  claims	  that	  could	  not	  have	  been	  asserted	  before	  the	  judgment	  was	  ren-­‐dered.64	   	   Indeed,	   it	   is	   well	   understood	   that	   a	   final	   judgment	   extin-­‐guishes	  all	   claims	   that	  arise	   from	   the	   same	   transaction	  as	   the	   subject	  matter	  of	  the	  judgment	  and	  that	  could	  have	  been	  raised	  in	  the	  former	  suit.65	   	   Put	   another	  way,	   if	   a	   plaintiff	   raises	   a	   claim	   that	   is	   “the	   same	  claim”	  as	  one	  that	  the	  plaintiff	  raised	  or	  could	  have	  raised	  in	  an	  action	  that	   led	   to	   final	   judgment,	   the	   new	   claim	   is	   barred.	   	   Foster	   is	   not	   at	  odds	   with	   this	   basic	   claim	   preclusion	   principle.	   	   Instead,	   Foster	   ex-­‐plains	   that	   successive	   accusations	   of	   infringement	   against	   products	  that	  are	  essentially	  the	  same	  are	  the	  “same	  claim”	  for	  preclusion	  pur-­‐poses.66	  	  Under	  the	  Foster	  rule,	  if	  final	  judgment	  of	  infringement	  is	  en-­‐	  
MGA,	   the	  court	  concluded	  based	  on	  Young	  Engineers	   that	  res	   judicata	  bars	  subsequent	   infringe-­‐ment	  claims,	  but	  only	  if	  the	  presently	  and	  formerly	  accused	  products	  are	  “identical.”MGA,	  699	  F.	  Supp.	  at	  615.	  	  Contrary	  to	  the	  Federal	  Circuit’s	  opinion	  in	  Aspex,	  the	  MGA	  court	  did	  not	  hold	  that	  a	  judgment	  of	  infringement	  does	  not	  bar	  any	  claims	  based	  on	  post-­‐judgment	  infringing	  acts.	  	   62.	   	  Brain	  Life,	  746	  F.3d	  at	  1053.	  	   63.	   	  Young	  Engineers	  is	  an	  “early”	  opinion	  only	  in	  that	  it	  was	  decided	  shortly	  after	  Congress	  established	  the	  Federal	  Circuit	  in	  1982.	  	  See	  An	  Act	  To	  Establish	  a	  United	  States	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  for	  the	  Federal	  Circuit,	  To	  Establish	  a	  United	  States	  Claims	  Court,	  and	  for	  Other	  Purposes,	  Pub.	  L.	  97-­‐164,	  96	  Stat.	  25,	  25,	  58	  (1982).	  	   64.	   	  Lawlor	  v.	  Nat’l	  Screen	  Serv.	  Corp.,	  349	  U.S.	  322,	  328	  (1955).	  	   65.	   	  E.g.,	  RESTATEMENT	  (SECOND)	  OF	  JUDGMENTS	  §	  24(1)	  (1982).	  	   66.	   	  Roche	  Palo	  Alto	  v.	  Apotex,	  531	  F.3d	  1372,	  1379	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2008)	  (citing	  Foster,	  972	  F.3d	  at	  479–80).	  	  See	  also	  Acumed	  v.	  Stryker,	  525	  F.3d	  1319,	  1324	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2008)	  (reasoning	  that	  “one	  of	   the	  essential	   transactional	   facts	  giving	  rise	   to	  a	  patent	   infringement	  claim	   is	   ‘the	  structure	  of	  the	  device	  or	  devices	  in	  issue’”)	  (quoting	  Foster,	  972	  F.2d	  at	  479).	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  tered	   against	   a	   product,	   then	   that	   judgment	   establishes	   between	   the	  parties	  to	  the	  suit	  that	  any	  future	  products	  that	  do	  not	  differ	  materially	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  contested	  patent	  claims	  are	  also	  infringing.	  The	  Federal	  Circuit’s	  remark	  in	  Young	  Engineers	  that	  judgment	  on	  a	  patent	  infringement	  claim	  does	  not	  “embrace[]	  more	  than	  the	  specific	  devices	  before	  the	  court	  in	  the	  first	  suit”67	  does	  not	  require	  a	  different	  conclusion.	  	  There,	  Shur-­‐Lok	  Corporation,	  a	  manufacturer,	  accused	  The	  Young	  Engineers,	  Inc.,	  of	  importing	  aircraft	  components	  that	  infringed	  Shur-­‐Lok’s	  patents.68	  	  The	  Central	  District	  of	  California	  dismissed	  Shur-­‐Lok’s	   claims	  with	  prejudice.69	   	  When	  The	  Young	  Engineers	   continued	  to	   import	   similar	   components,	   Shur-­‐Lok	   filed	   a	   complaint	   under	   the	  Tariff	  Act70	  premised	  on	  patent	   infringement	  before	   the	   International	  Trade	   Commission,	   who	   found	   infringement	   and	   prohibited	   further	  importation	  of	  the	  components.71	  On	  appeal,	  The	  Young	  Engineers	  argued	  that	  the	  prior	  dismissal	  of	  Shur-­‐Lok’s	  claims	  barred	  all	  future	  claims	  against	  it	  for	  infringement	  of	  the	   same	   patent.72	   	   The	   Federal	   Circuit	   rejected	   this	   argument	   as	  “clearly	  untenable.”73	   	  The	   court	   reviewed	   the	   familiar	  principles	  dis-­‐cussed	  above	  from	  the	  unique	  perspective	  of	  patent	  law,	  noting	  that	  a	  judgment	   of	   infringement	   establishes	   that	   the	   accused	   devices	   were	  “used	  or	  sold	  without	  authority,”	  and	   that	  a	   judgment	  of	  noninfringe-­‐ment	  affords	  those	  devices	  “the	  status	  of	  noninfringement.”74	  	  Critical-­‐ly,	   it	   concluded	   that	   The	   Young	   Engineers	  were	   not	   entitled	   to	   enjoy	  noninfringer	   status	   in	   the	   case	   before	   the	   ITC	   because	   the	   company	  “made	  no	  attempt”	  to	  prove	  “that	  the	  devices	  [accused]	  were	  the	  same	  as	  those	  in	  the	  [former]	  suit.”75	   	  The	  court’s	  reasoning	  suggests	  that	  a	  judgment	  embracing	  “the	  specific	  devices	  before	   the	  court	   in	   the	   first	  suit”	  would	  also	  sweep	  in	  subsequent	  devices	  that	  are	  “the	  same.”	   In-­‐deed,	  the	  Foster	  court	  and	  at	  least	  one	  subsequent	  Federal	  Circuit	  pan-­‐el	  remarked	  that	  the	  “essentially	  the	  same”	  test	  follows	  naturally	  from	  
Young	  Engineers.76	  	  	   67.	   Young	  Eng’rs,	  Inc.	  v.	  U.S.	  Int’l	  Trade	  Comm’n,	  721	  F.2d	  1305,	  1316	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  1983)	  	   68.	   	  Id.	  at	  1307.	  	   69.	   	  Id.	  at	  1307–08.	  	   70.	   	  Tariff	  Act	  of	  1930,	  Pub.	  L.	  71-­‐361,	  46	  Stat.	  590	  (1930)	  (codified	  as	  amended	  at	  19	  U.S.C.	  §§	  1202–1683g).	  	   71.	   	  Young	  Eng’rs,	  721	  F.2d	  at	  1308–09.	  	   72.	   	  Id.	  at	  1316.	  	   73.	   	  Id.	  	   74.	   	  Id.	  	   75.	   	  Id.	  at	  1316.	  	   76.	   	  Acumed	  v.	  Stryker,	  525	  F.3d	  1319,	  1324	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2008);	  Foster	  v.	  Hallco	  Mfg.	  Co.,	  Inc.,	  947	  F.2d	  	  469,	  479–80	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  1991)	  .	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  to	  the	  necessary	  implication	  of	  Aspex	  and	  Brain	  Life,	  the	  “essentially	  the	  same”	  test	  does	  not	  depart	  from	  the	  common-­‐law	  prin-­‐ciple	   that	   judgment	  on	  a	   claim	  bars	  action	  on	   the	  same	  claim	   in	   later	  suits.	  	  It	  merely	  defines	  the	  “same	  claim”	  to	  include	  accusations	  against	  new	   products	   that	   do	   not	   differ	   in	   any	   material	   respect	   from	   those	  formerly	  at	  issue.	  
B.	  In	  Practice,	  Did	  Courts	  Apply	  the	  “Essentially	  the	  Same”	  Test	  Only	  
to	  Products	  That	  Could	  Have	  Been	  Accused	  of	  Infringement	  in	  the	  Former	  
Action?	  The	  Brain	  Life	  court	  reiterated	  Foster’s	  holding	  that	  successive	  in-­‐fringement	  claims	  are	  the	  same	  claim	  if	  the	  successively	  accused	  prod-­‐ucts	   are	   “essentially	   the	   same,”	   but	   went	   on	   to	   restrict	   the	   rule	   to	  products	  that	  existed	  while	  the	  former	  lawsuit	  was	  pending.77	  	  If	  previ-­‐ous	   courts	   applied	   the	   “essentially	   the	   same”	   test	   only	   to	   such	   prod-­‐ucts,	  then	  Aspex	  and	  Brain	  Life	  do	  not	  cause	  tension	  with	  Foster.	  Of	  course,	  as	  noted	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  Foster	  itself	  does	  not	  fit	  into	  the	  box	  that	   the	  Brain	  Life	  court	  has	  drawn.	   	  Foster	  began	  to	  sell	  new	  truck	  bed	  conveyors	  four	  years	  after	  Hallco’s	  former	  infringement	  action	  ended	  in	  a	  consent	  judgment.78	  	  These	  products	  certainly	  did	  not	  exist	  while	  the	  earlier	  suit	  was	  pending.	  	  Nevertheless,	  the	  Federal	  Cir-­‐cuit	   held	   that	   Foster’s	   subsequent	   declaratory	   judgment	   action	   was	  barred	  if	  the	  new	  conveyor	  products	  were	  essentially	  the	  same	  as	  the	  ones	  Hallco	  had	  earlier	  accused	  of	  infringement.79	  	  Brain	  Life’s	  sugges-­‐tion	   that	   the	   “essentially	   the	   same”	   test	  only	   applies	   to	  products	   that	  could	  have	  been	  accused	  of	  infringement	  in	  the	  first	  suit	  is	  squarely	  at	  odds	  with	  Foster.	  
C.	  In	  Practice,	  Did	  Courts	  in	  the	  Foster	  Line	  of	  Cases	  Actually	  Apply	  
Issue	  Preclusion	  Principles?	  In	  Aspex,	   one	   of	   the	   defendants	   relied	   on	   the	   last	   opinion	   in	   the	  
Foster	   line,	   Nystrom	   v.	   Trex	   Co.,80	   in	   arguing	   that	   Aspex’s	   latest	   in-­‐fringement	  claims	  were	  barred.81	   	  The	  Aspex	  court	  noted	  that	  the	  first	  round	  of	  litigation	  in	  Nystrom	  “had	  resolved	  certain	  issues	  against	  the	  appellant,”	  and	  that	  the	  second	  action	  amounted	  to	  an	  attempt	  “to	  liti-­‐	  	   77.	   	  Brain	  Life,	  LLC	  v.	  Elekta	  Inc.,746	  F.3d	  1045,	  1053-­‐–54	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2014).	  	   78.	   	  947	  F.2d	  at	  472.	  	   79.	   	  Id.	  at	  479–80.	  	   80.	   	  Nystrom	  v.	  Trex	  Co.,	  Inc.,	  580	  F.3d	  1281	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2009).	  	   81.	   	  Aspex	  Eyewear,	  Inc.	  v.	  Marchon	  Eyewear,	  Inc.,	  672	  F.3d	  1335,	  1343	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2012).	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  gate	  those	  issues	  again	  .	  .	  .	  ,	  hoping	  for	  a	  different	  outcome.”82	  	  Accord-­‐ing	  to	  the	  Aspex	  court,	  the	  Nystrom	  court	  applied	  the	  doctrine	  of	  issue	  preclusion,	   determining	   that	   the	   parties	   had	   fully	   and	   fairly	   litigated	  the	  issues	  in	  the	  earlier	  action	  and	  that	  the	  appellant	  was	  barred	  from	  raising	  them	  again.83	   	  The	  Aspex	  court	  reached	  this	  conclusion	  despite	  observing	  that	  the	  Nystrom	  court	  expressly	  relied	  on	  claim	  preclusion,	  not	  issue	  preclusion.84	   	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  Aspex	  court	  has	  attempted	  to	  reclassify	  the	  “essentially	  the	  same”	  test	  as	  an	  issue	  preclusion	  doc-­‐trine	  rather	  than	  a	  claim	  preclusion	  one,	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  opinions	  in	  the	  Foster	   line	  actually	  apply	  issue	  preclusion	  principles.	   	  At	   least	  one	  district	  court	  has	  followed	  Aspex	  in	  this	  effort.85	  Like	  Nystrom,	  all	  but	  one	  of	   the	  Federal	  Circuit	  opinions	  to	  apply	  the	  “essentially	  the	  same”	  test	  did	  so	  expressly	  in	  the	  context	  of	  claim	  preclusion.86	   	   The	   sole	   exception	   is	  Ecolab,	   Inc.	   v.	   Paraclipse,	   Inc.,87	   in	  which	  the	  Federal	  Circuit	  applied	  the	  “essentially	  the	  same”	  test	  with-­‐out	  stating	  whether	   it	  did	  so	  under	  the	  claim	  preclusion	  or	   issue	  pre-­‐clusion	   doctrine.88	   	   Further,	   the	  Aspex	   court	   only	   discussed	  Nystrom,	  and	  did	  not	   investigate	  whether	   the	  other	  cases	   in	   the	  Foster	   line	  ap-­‐plied	   the	   “essentially	   the	   same”	   test	   only	   where	   issues	   raised	   in	   the	  present	  infringement	  action	  were	  fully	  and	  fairly	  litigated	  in	  the	  former	  one.89	  	  Nevertheless,	  if	  Foster	  and	  all	  its	  progeny	  prohibited	  successive	  suits	   against	   substantially	   similar	   products	   only	   where	   the	   prior	   in-­‐fringement	  claim	  was	  actually	  litigated	  to	  a	  final	  judgment	  on	  the	  mer-­‐its,	   then	   the	  Aspex	   court’s	  attempt	   to	  cabin	   the	   “essentially	   the	  same”	  test	  within	  issue	  preclusion	  may	  have	  merit.	  	  	   82.	   	  Id.	  	   83.	   	  Id.	  	   84.	   	  Id.	  	   85.	   	  See	  Pet	  Prod.	  Innovations,	  LLC	  v.	  Paw	  Wash,	  L.L.C.,	  No.	  11-­‐7182,	  2012	  WL	  4461765,	  at	  *5	  (N.D.	  Ill.	  Sept.	  25,	  2012)	  (reasoning	  based	  on	  Aspex	  that	  a	  prior	  suit	  between	  the	  parties	  resolved	  the	   issue	   of	   whether	   the	   presently	   accused	   products	   were	   the	   same	   as	   the	   formerly	   accused	  products).	  	   86.	   	  See	  Nystrom	  v.	  Trex	  Co.,	  Inc.,	  580	  F.3d	  1281,	  1285	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2009)	  (“[f]or	  claim	  preclu-­‐sion	  in	  a	  patent	  case,	  an	  accused	  infringer	  must	  show	  that	  the	  accused	  product	  or	  process	  in	  the	  second	  suit	  is	  ‘essentially	  the	  same’	  as	  the	  accused	  product	  or	  process	  in	  the	  first	  suit.”);	  Acumed	  v.	  Stryker,	  525	  F.3d	  1319,	  1326	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2008)	  1326	  (remarking	  that	  two	  patent	  claims	  are	  the	  same	  for	  claim	  preclusion	  purposes	  if	  the	  devices	  in	  each	  case	  are	  “essentially	  the	  same”);	  Roche	  Palo	  Alto	  v.	  Apotex,	  531	  F.3d	  1372,	  1379	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2008)	  (“[u]nder	  the	  law	  of	  the	  Federal	  Circuit,	  an	  infringement	  claim	  in	  a	  second	  suit	  is	  the	  ‘same	  claim’	  as	  in	  an	  earlier	  infringement	  suit	  if	  the	  accused	  products	  in	  the	  two	  suits	  are	  ‘essentially	  the	  same.’”);	  Hallco	  Mfg.	  Co.	  v.	  Foster,	  256	  F.3d	  1290,	  1295	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2001)	  (discussing	  Foster	  and	  the	  “essentially	  the	  same”	  test	  in	  the	  context	  of	  claim	   preclusion);	   Foster,	   947	   F.2d	   at	   479–80	   (holding	   that	   claim	   preclusion	   bars	   successive	  infringement	  claims	  if	  the	  presently	  and	  formerly	  accused	  products	  are	  “essentially	  the	  same”).	  	   87.	   	  Ecolab,	  Inc.	  v.	  Paraclipse,	  Inc.,	  285	  F.3d	  1362	  	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2002).	  	   88.	   	  Id.	  at	  1376–77.	  	   89.	   	  Aspex	  Eyewear,	  Inc.	  v.	  Marchon	  Eyewear	  672	  F.3d	  1335,	  1343	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2012).	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   the	   Federal	   Circuit	   applied	   the	   “essentially	   the	  same”	   test	   (or	   remanded	   for	   application	   of	   the	   test)	   in	   six	   opinions	  before	  Aspex.90	   	   In	   some	  of	   these	   cases,	   issues	  of	   infringement	  do	  ap-­‐pear	   to	   have	   been	   actually	   litigated	   in	   the	   prior	   action.	   	   In	  Nystrom,	  after	  the	  district	  court	  issued	  a	  claim	  construction	  order,	  Nystrom	  con-­‐ceded	   that	   he	   could	   not	   prove	   infringement,	   and	   the	   court	   granted	  summary	   judgment	   of	   noninfringement	   on	   all	   contested	   patent	  claims.91	  	  The	  Federal	  Circuit	  reversed	  the	  district	  court’s	  construction	  in	  part,	   and	  on	   remand	   the	  district	   court	  dismissed	  Nystrom’s	   claims	  on	  waiver	  grounds.92	  	  At	  the	  very	  least,	  then,	  the	  parties	  in	  the	  former	  action	  litigated	  issues	  pertaining	  to	  the	  proper	  construction	  of	  the	  pa-­‐tent’s	  claims.	  	  In	  Acumed,	  the	  parties	  pursued	  the	  prior	  suit	  all	  the	  way	  to	  trial	  and	  a	   jury	  verdict	  of	   infringement.93	   	  There	  can	  be	  little	  doubt	  that	  issues	  pertinent	  to	  infringement	  were	  actually	  litigated.	   	  In	  Roche	  
Palo	  Alto,	   the	  preclusion	  defense	  was	  directed	  not	  at	  an	   infringement	  claim	  but	  at	  a	  defense	  of	  invalidity.94	  	  In	  the	  prior	  suit,	  the	  district	  court	  held	  after	  a	  bench	  trial	   that	   the	  patent	  at	   issue	  was	  valid,	  and	  the	  de-­‐fendant	   challenged	   the	   patent’s	   validity	   in	   a	   subsequent	   suit.95	   	   The	  issue	   of	   validity	   therefore	   appears	   to	   have	   been	   actually	   litigated.96	  	  Finally,	  in	  Hallco,	  after	  the	  district	  court	  entered	  summary	  judgment	  of	  infringement,	  the	  parties	  moved	  for	  dismissal	  with	  prejudice	  pursuant	  to	  a	  settlement	  agreement.97	  	  Though	  the	  case	  ultimately	  settled,	  then,	  the	   issues	   pertaining	   to	   infringement	   were	   actually	   litigated	   in	   the	  summary	  judgment	  proceedings.98	  In	   the	   remaining	   two	   cases,	   however,	   the	   prior	   action	   ended	   in	  settlement	   without	   prior	   dispositive	   rulings	   from	   the	   trial	   court.	   	   In	  	  	   90.	   	  This	  number	   is	  based	  on	  a	  Westlaw	  search	   for	  Federal	  Circuit	  opinions	  containing	   the	  terms	  “Foster”	  and	  “essentially	  the	  same”	  and	  issued	  after	  September	  27,	  1991.	  	  The	  search	  was	  conducted	  on	  June	  14,	  2014.	  	   91.	   	  	  Nystrom	  v.	  Trex	  Co.,	  Inc.,	  580	  F.3d	  1281,	  1284	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2009).	  	   92.	   	  Id.	  	   93.	   	  Acumed	  v.	  Stryker	  Corp.,	  525	  F.3d	  1319,	  1322	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2008).	  	   94.	   	  Roche	  Palo	  Alto	  LLC	  v.	  Apotex,	  Inc.,	  531	  F.3d	  1372,	  1379	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2008).	  	   95.	   	  Id.	  at	  1376.	  	  	  	   96.	   	  Interestingly,	   the	   district	   court	   in	   this	   case	   applied	   both	   claim	   preclusion	   and	   issue	  preclusion	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  subsequent	  invalidity	  defense	  was	  barred.	  	  Id.	  at	  1376–77;	  Roche	  Palo	  Alto	  LLC	  v.	  Apotex,	  Inc.,	  526	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  958,	  994–96,	  997–99.	  	  The	  Federal	  Circuit	  expressly	  considered	  only	  claim	  preclusion,	  Roche	  Palo	  Alto,	  531	  F.3d	  at	  1379–81,	  but	  the	  appellant	  may	  not	  have	   challenged	   the	   district	   court’s	   issue	   preclusion	   ruling	   because	   it	   left	   open	   an	   assertion	   of	  invalidity	  based	  on	  obviousness,	  Roche	  Palo	  Alto,	  526	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  at	  997.	  	   97.	   	  256	  F.3d	  at	  1293.	  	  	  	   98.	   	  Where	  the	  court	  has	  issued	  rulings	  before	  the	  parties	  reach	  a	  settlement,	  those	  rulings	  may	  have	  issue	  preclusive	  effect	  if	  they	  “are	  firm	  and	  consistent	  with	  the	  subsequent	  settlement	  agreement.”	  	  Hartley	  v.	  Mentor	  Corp.,	  869	  F.2d	  1469,	  1471–72	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  1989).	  	  That	  the	  parties	  in	  Hallco	   ultimately	   settled	   does	   not	   necessarily	   strip	   the	   court’s	   summary	   judgment	   ruling	   of	  preclusive	  effect.	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Ecolab,	  the	  first	  action	  between	  the	  parties	  ended	  in	  entry	  of	  a	  consent	  judgment	   of	   infringement.99	   	   The	   Federal	   Circuit	   concluded	   that	   the	  product	   accused	   in	   the	   second	   action	   was	   materially	   different	   from	  that	  in	  the	  first,	  and	  held	  that	  claim	  preclusion	  did	  not	  bar	  the	  defend-­‐ant	   from	   asserting	   an	   invalidity	   defense.100	   	   In	   Foster,	   the	   case	   that	  started	  it	  all,	   the	  parties	  settled	  Hallco’s	  prior	  patent	  infringement	  ac-­‐tion	  and	  terminated	  it	  with	  a	  consent	  judgment.101	  	  As	  noted	  above,	  the	  Federal	   Circuit	   remanded	   the	   subsequent	   action	   for	   determination	  whether	   the	   respectively	   accused	   products	   were	   essentially	   the	  same.102	  When	  an	  action	  ends	  pursuant	   to	  a	  settlement	  before	  dispositive	  rulings	  have	  been	  made,	  “no	  issue	  may	  be	  said	  to	  have	  been	  fully,	  fairly	  or	   actually	   litigated.”103	   	   In	   Ecolab	   and	   Foster,	   the	   Federal	   Circuit’s	  opinions	  give	  no	  indication	  that	  the	  court	  in	  the	  prior	  litigation	  issued	  any	   rulings	   with	   potential	   issue	   preclusive	   effect.	   	   To	   infer	   that	   the	  court	  in	  these	  cases	  actually	  relied	  on	  issue	  preclusion	  principles	  when	  applying	  the	  “essentially	  the	  same”	  test	  therefore	  would	  be	  an	  unjusti-­‐fied	  leap.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  outcomes	  in	  all	  six	  of	  the	  cases	  in	  the	  
Foster	   line	   are	   explained	  more	   parsimoniously	   by	   accepting	   that	   the	  court	  did	  what	  it	  said	  it	  did:	  apply	  the	  “essentially	  the	  same”	  test	  in	  the	  context	  of	  claim	  preclusion.	  Each	  of	  the	  Federal	  Circuit’s	  three	  attempts	  to	  reconcile	  Aspex	  and	  
Brain	  Life	  with	  its	  prior	  precedent	  collides	  fatally	  with	  the	  opinions	  in	  the	  Foster	   line.	   	  This	   failure	   is	  perhaps	   inevitable,	  as	   the	  conflict	   is	   ir-­‐reconcilable.	  	  Foster	  and	  its	  progeny	  provide	  that	  claim	  preclusion	  bars	  successive	   infringement	   claims	   against	   products	   that	   are	   essentially	  the	  same,	   full	   stop,	  while	  Aspex	   and	  Brain	  Life	  declare	   that	  claim	  pre-­‐clusion	  never	  bars	  claims	  against	  products	  that	  did	  not	  exist	  as	  of	  the	  prior	  judgment,	  essentially	  the	  same	  or	  not.	  	  The	  two	  lines	  are	  squarely	  
	  	   99.	   	  Ecolab,	  Inc.	  v.	  Paraclipse,	  Inc.,	  285	  F.3d	  1362,	  1367	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2002).	  	  Though	  the	  parties	  litigated	   the	   earlier	   infringement	   claim	   for	   two	   years,	   id.,	   no	   dispositive	   rulings	   were	   entered	  before	  the	  parties	  agreed	  to	  entry	  of	  a	  consent	  judgment,	  Docket	  Report,	  Ecolab,	  Inc.	  v.	  Paraclipse,	  Inc.,	  No.	  94-­‐601.	   	  Accordingly,	   resolution	  of	   the	  earlier	   suit	   could	  not	  have	  had	   issue	  preclusive	  effect	  in	  the	  subsequent	  action.	  	  Hartley,	  869	  F.2d	  at	  1471–72.	  	   100.	   	  Ecolab,	  Inc.,	  285	  F.3d	  	  at	  1377.	  	   101.	   	  Foster	  v.	  Hallco,	  947	  F.2d	  469,	  472	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  1991).	   	  Though	   the	  parties	   in	  Hallco	   and	  
Foster	   are	   the	  same,	   the	  prior	  actions	  referred	   to	   in	  each	  opinion	  are	  different.	   	  The	  settlement	  agreement	  in	  Hallco	  was	  executed	  in	  1995	  or	  later.	  See	  Hallco	  Mfg.	  Co.	  v.	  Foster,	  256	  F.3d	  1290,	  1293	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2001)	  (noting	  that	  the	  patent	  at	  issue	  was	  issued	  in	  1995).The	  consent	  judgment	  in	  Foster	  was	  entered	  in	  1982.	  947	  F.2d	  at	  472.	  	   102.	   	  Foster,	  947	  F.2d	  at	  472.	  	   103.	   	  Id.	   at	   480;	   see	   also	   Hartley,	   869	   F.2d	   at	   1471–72	   (noting	   that	   generally,	   a	   stipulated	  judgment	  pursuant	  to	  settlement	  “will	  give	  rise	  only	  to	  claim	  preclusion,	  not	  issue	  preclusion”).	  
394	   CHICAGO-­‐KENT	  JOURNAL	  OF	  INTELLECTUAL	  PROPERTY	   [Vol	  14:2	  at	  odds.	  	  Because	  the	  three-­‐judge	  panels	  in	  Aspex	  and	  Brain	  Life	  lacked	  the	  power	  to	  overrule	  the	  opinions	  in	  the	  Foster	  line,104	  Foster	  controls.	  III.	  THE	  EN	  BANC	  FEDERAL	  CIRCUIT	  SHOULD	  OVERRULE	  FOSTER	  AND	  AFFIRM	  THE	  ASPEX/BRAIN	  LIFE	  RULE	  BECAUSE	  IT	  PREVENTS	  ADJUDGED	  INFRINGERS	  FROM	  ENJOYING	  PERPETUAL	  LICENSES	  TO	  CONTINUE	  INFRINGING	  “[T]he	  peace	  and	  repose	  of	   society”	   is	   “the	  very	  object	   for	  which	  civil	  courts	  have	  been	  established.”105	   	  The	  doctrine	  of	  res	  judicata	  ac-­‐complishes	  this	  object	  by	  ensuring	  that	  a	  final	  judgment	  on	  the	  merits	  is	  “a	  finality	  as	  to	  the	  claim	  or	  demand	  in	  controversy.”106	  	  A	  party	  who	  wins	  a	  judgment	  of	  infringement	  enjoys	  repose	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  deter-­‐mination	  that	   the	  accused	  product	  “is	  made,	  used	  or	  sold	  without	  au-­‐thority	   under	   the	   claim(s)	   of	   a	   valid	   enforceable	   patent.”107	   	   On	   the	  other	  hand,	  “where	  the	  alleged	  infringer	  prevails,	   the	  accused	  devices	  have	   the	   status	   of	   noninfringements,	   and	   the	   defendant	   acquires	   the	  status	  of	  a	  noninfringer	   to	   that	  extent.”108	   	   In	  short,	  a	   judgment	  of	   in-­‐fringement	   should	   shield	   the	   prevailing	   party	   from	   future	   infringing	  activities	   by	   the	   other	   party,	   and	   a	   judgment	   of	   noninfringement	  should	  confer	  protection	  from	  wasteful	  successive	  litigation.	  In	  defining	   successive	   infringement	   accusations	   against	  products	  that	   are	   essentially	   the	   same	   as	   the	   “same	   claim”	   for	   preclusion	   pur-­‐poses,	   Foster	   achieves	   these	   objectives	   in	   at	   least	   two	   respects.	   	   The	  
Foster	   rule	   protects	   parties	   whose	   products	   have	   been	   found	   not	   to	  infringe	  from	  the	  harassment	  and	  expense	  of	  multiple	  lawsuits.109	  	  The	  rule	   also	   protects	   parties	   who	   prevail	   on	   their	   infringement	   claims	  from	   future	   claims	   for	   declaratory	   judgment	   of	   invalidity	   or	   nonin-­‐fringement,	  an	  effect	  that	  would	  disappear	  if	  the	  Aspex/Brain	  Life	  rule	  were	  the	  law.110	  	  	   104.	   	  “This	  court	  has	  adopted	  the	  rule	  that	  prior	  decisions	  of	  a	  panel	  of	  the	  court	  are	  binding	  precedent	  on	  subsequent	  panels	  unless	  and	  until	  overturned	  in	  banc.”	  	  Newell	  Cos.	  v.	  Kenney	  Mfg.	  Co.,	  864	  F.2d	  757,	  765	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  1988).	  	   105.	   	  Nevada	  v.	  United	  States,	  463	  U.S.	  110,	  129	  (1983)	  (quoting	  S.	  Pac.	  R.R.	  v.	  United	  States,	  168	  U.S.	  1,	  49	  (1897)).	  	   106.	   	  Id.	  (quoting	  Cromwell	  v.	  Cnty.	  of	  Sac,	  94	  U.S.	  351,	  352	  (1876)).	  	   107.	   	  Young	  Eng’rs.	  Inc.	  v.	  U.S.	  Int’l	  Trade	  Comm’n,	  721	  F.3d	  1305,	  1316	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  1983).	  	   108.	   	  Id.	  	   109.	   	  See	  Nystrom	  v.	  Trex	  Co.,	  580	  F.3d	  1281,	  1284–85	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2009)	  (holding	  that	  a	  prior	  judgment	  of	  noninfringement	  barred	  a	   subsequent	   accusation	  of	   infringement	   against	  products	  that	  were	  “essentially	  the	  same”	  as	  those	  accused	  in	  the	  first	  suit).	  	  	   110.	   	  See	  Foster	  v.	  Hallco,	  947	  F.2d	  469,	  473,	  479–80	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  1991)	  (concluding	  that	  Foster’s	  claim	   for	  declaratory	   judgment	  of	   invalidity	  and	  unenforceability	   is	   the	   “same”	  as	  a	  prior	   claim	  between	  the	  parties	  that	  ended	  in	  a	  consent	  judgment	  if	  the	  products	  accused	  in	  the	  two	  suits	  are	  essentially	   the	   same).	   	   The	  Foster	   court	   took	   care	   to	  point	   out	   that	   a	  party	   cannot	  maintain	   an	  action	  for	  a	  declaratory	  judgment	  of	  invalidity	  unless	  an	  underlying	  infringement	  dispute	  exists.	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  A	  less	  laudable	  consequence	  obtains	  when	  the	  following	  sequence	  occurs:	  a	  party	  wins	  a	   judgment	  of	   infringement,	   the	  other	  party	  con-­‐tinues	  to	  produce	  and	  sell	  essentially	  the	  same	  infringing	  product,	  and	  the	   prevailing	   party	   in	   the	   prior	   action	   sues	   for	   infringement	   again.	  	  The	  district	  court’s	  application	  of	  the	  rule	  in	  Aspex	  illustrates	  the	  prob-­‐lem.	  	  There,	  Aspex’s	  prior	  action	  against	  Revolution’s	  eyeglasses	  ended	  in	  a	   judgment	  of	   infringement,	  and	  Revolution	  continued	   to	  manufac-­‐ture	   similar	   products	   afterward.111	   	   The	   district	   court	   threw	   out	  Aspex’s	  subsequent	  infringement	  accusation	  against	  the	  new	  eyeglass-­‐es	  because	  it	  found	  them	  to	  be	  essentially	  the	  same	  as	  those	  at	  issue	  in	  the	   prior	   suit.112	   	   In	   other	   words,	   even	   as	   the	   judgment	   in	   the	   prior	  action	   established	   that	   Revolution’s	   eyeglasses	   infringed	   Aspex’s	   pa-­‐tent,	  the	  judgment	  barred	  Aspex	  from	  pursuing	  Revolution	  for	  continu-­‐ing	  to	   infringe	  the	  patent	  with	  substantially	  the	  same	  products.	   	  Simi-­‐Similarly,	   the	   district	   court	   held	   that	   Aspex’s	   settlement	   agreement	  with	  Marchon,	   in	  which	  Marchon	   agreed	  not	   to	   produce	   and	   sell	   any	  more	   of	   the	   accused	   eyeglasses	   “and	   substantially	   similar	   designs,”	  prevented	  Aspex	  from	  bringing	  a	  subsequent	  action	  against	  essentially	  the	  same	  Marchon	  eyeglasses.113	   	  In	  effect,	  the	  district	  court’s	  applica-­‐tion	  of	  the	  “essentially	  the	  same”	  test	  in	  this	  case	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  “giv-­‐ing	   the	   infringer[s]	   an	   unpaid	   license	   for	   the	   remainder	   of	   the	   life	   of	  the	  patent,”	  an	  “exceptionally	  unfair”	  result.114	  The	  Aspex/Brain	   Life	   rule	   is	   preferable	   to	   Foster	   because	   it	   pre-­‐vents	  a	  judgment	  of	  infringement	  from	  granting	  the	  infringer	  a	  gratui-­‐tous	  license	  to	  practice	  the	  patent.	  	  In	  defining	  an	  infringement	  “claim”	  to	  embrace	  accusations	  against	  only	  the	  prior	  accused	  product	  and	  any	  substantially	   similar	  products	   that	  were	  made	  or	   sold	  during	   the	   for-­‐mer	   suit,	   the	   rule	  ensures	   that	  a	  party	  who	  proves	   infringement	  may	  	  A	  district	  court	  lacks	  jurisdiction	  over	  a	  declaratory	  judgment	  action	  unless	  it	  arises	  from	  a	  “case”	  or	  “controversy”	  as	  the	  terms	  are	  used	  in	  Article	  III	  of	   the	  Constitution.	   	  See	  28	  U.S.C.	  §	  2201(a)	  (2012)	   (providing	   that	   a	   declaratory	   judgment	   action	   requires	   “a	   case	   of	   actual	   controversy”);	  Teva	  Pharms.	  USA,	  Inc.	  v.	  Novartis	  Pharms.	  Corp.,	  482	  F.3d	  1330,	  1338	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2007)	  (remark-­‐ing	  that	  “an	  ‘actual	  controversy’	  .	  .	  .	  is	  the	  same	  as	  an	  Article	  III	  case	  or	  controversy”)	  (citing	  Aetna	  Life	  Ins.	  Co.	  of	  Hartford,	  Conn.	  v.	  Haworth,	  300	  U.S.	  227,	  239–41	  (1937)).	   	  Accordingly,	  a	  district	  court	   lacks	   jurisdiction	   over	   a	   claim	   for	   a	   declaration	   of	   invalidity	   unless	   the	   claim	   rests	   on	   a	  “controversy”	  over	  infringement.	  Foster,	  972	  F.2d	  at	  479.	  	  Under	  the	  Aspex/Brain	  Life	  rule,	  a	  later	  infringement	  suit	  against	  a	  product	  that	  did	  not	  exist	  as	  of	  a	  former	  judgment	  of	  infringement	  is	  not	   barred,	   and	   so	   the	   possibility	   of	   such	   a	   suit	   furnishes	   a	   “controversy”	   based	   on	  which	   the	  formerly	  adjudged	  infringer	  may	  seek	  declaratory	  judgment	  of	  noninfringement	  or	  invalidity.	  	  	  	   111.	   	  Aspex	  Eyewear,	  Inc.	  v.	  Marchon	  Eyewear,	  Inc.,	  672	  F.3d	  1335,1338	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2012);	  see	  
also	  id.	  at	  1342	  (noting	  that	  at	  least	  some	  of	  the	  new	  designs	  “were	  not	  in	  existence	  at	  the	  time	  of	  [the]	  earlier	  litigation”).	  	   112.	   	  Id.	  at	  1340.	  	   113.	   	  Id.	  at	  1339–40.	  	   114.	   	  Id.	  at	  1344.	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  accuse	  future	  products	  that	  practice	   its	  patent	   in	  essentially	  the	  same	  way.	  Even	  as	  the	  new	  rule	  prevents	  adjudged	  infringers	  from	  obtaining	  a	  perpetual	   license	  to	  practice	  the	  patent,	   it	  also	  eliminates	  the	  Foster	  rule’s	   beneficial	   consequences.	   	   First,	   if	   adjudged	   infringers	   are	   no	  longer	   protected	   from	   action	   against	   future	   infringing	   products,	   then	  adjudged	  noninfringers	  are	  also	  fair	  game	  for	  successive	  infringement	  accusations.	   	   The	   Brain	   Life	   court	   solved	   this	   problem	   by	   breathing	  new	   life	   into	   the	  Kessler	   doctrine.115	   	  When	   a	   party	   prevails	   over	   an	  infringement	  accusation,	  it	  obtains	  “a	  limited	  trade	  right”	  to	  “‘have	  that	  which	  [a	  court	  has	  determined]	  it	  lawfully	  produces	  freely	  bought	  and	  sold	   without	   restraint	   or	   interference.’”116	   	   Accordingly,	   the	   Kessler	  doctrine	  bars	   successive	   suits	   against	  products	   already	   judged	  not	   to	  infringe.117	   	  The	  doctrine	  also	  applies	  to	  subsequent	  products	  that	  are	  essentially	  the	  same	  as	  the	  adjudged	  noninfringing	  ones:	  because	  they	  do	  not	  differ	  materially	  in	  a	  manner	  pertinent	  to	  the	  challenged	  patent	  claims,	   they	   also	   benefit	   from	   the	   trade	   right	   conferred	   by	   the	   judg-­‐ment	  of	  noninfringement.118	  Of	  course,	  as	  noted	  above,	  the	  Aspex/Brain	  Life	  rule	  also	  does	  not	  shield	   parties	   who	   prevail	   on	   an	   infringement	   claim	   from	   future	   ac-­‐tions	  for	  declaratory	  judgments	  of	  invalidity	  or	  noninfringement.	  	  This	  should	  not	  be	  lamented.	  	  It	  would	  be	  unusual	  to	  allow	  one	  party	  to	  as-­‐sert	  infringement	  while	  not	  allowing	  the	  other	  to	  contend	  that	  the	  pa-­‐tent	   in	   question	   is	   not	   valid	   or	   that	   the	   accused	   product	   does	   not	  infringe.	   	   More	   importantly,	   if	   the	   issues	   of	   validity	   or	   infringement	  were	   actually	   litigated	   in	   the	   former	   suit,	   issue	   preclusion	  may	  bar	   a	  party’s	  attempt	  to	  litigate	  those	  questions	  again	  in	  a	  declaratory	  judg-­‐ment	  action.	   	  A	  settlement	  agreement	  that	  includes	  a	  clear	  and	  unam-­‐biguous	   release	   of	   future	   invalidity	   claims	   may	   also	   forestall	   future	  declaratory	  judgment	  actions.119	  The	  Aspex/Brain	  Life	   rule	   resolves	   the	   inequity	   that	   results	   from	  the	  Foster	   rule,	  and	  other	  doctrines	  patch	  up	   the	  holes	   that	  would	  be	  	  	   115.	   	  Brain	   Life,	   LLC	   v.	   Elekta	   Inc.,746	   F.3d	   1045,	   1056	   (Fed.	   Cir.	   2014);	   see	   supra,	   note	   50	  (discussing	  the	  origin	  and	  history	  of	  the	  Kessler	  doctrine).	  	  	   116.	   	  MGA,	  Inc.	  v.	  General	  Motors	  Corp.,	  827	  F.2d	  729,	  734	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  1987)	  (quoting	  Rubber	  TireWheel	   Co.	   v.	   Goodyear	   Tire	   and	   Rubber	   Co.,	   232	   U.S.	   413,	   418–19	   (1914))	   (alteration	   in	  original).	  	   117.	   	  See	  Brain	  Life,	  746	  F.3d	  at	  1057.	  	   118.	   	  See	   id.	   at	   1058	   (holding	   a	   subsequent	   suit	   against	   products	   that	   were	   essentially	   the	  same	  as	  those	  judged	  not	  to	  infringe	  in	  the	  former	  suit	  was	  barred	  under	  the	  Kessler	  doctrine).	  	   119.	   	  See,	   e.g.,	   Baseload	   Energy,	   Inc.	   v.	   Roberts,	   619	   F.3d	   1357,	   1361–62	   (Fed.	   Cir.	   2010)	  (“invalidity	   and	  unenforceability	   claims	  may	  be	   released,	   but	   only	   if	   the	   language	  of	   the	   agree-­‐ment	  or	  consent	  decree	  is	  clear	  and	  unambiguous.”).	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  left	  if	  Foster	  were	  excised	  from	  Federal	  Circuit	  precedent.	  	  To	  overrule	  
Foster	   in	   favor	   of	  Aspex	   seems	   a	   no-­‐brainer.	   	   Unfortunately,	   until	   the	  Federal	  Circuit	  weighs	  in	  en	  banc,	  Foster	  remains	  the	  law.	  Since	   the	   three-­‐judge	   panel	   in	   Aspex	   attempted	   to	   depart	   from	  
Foster,	  district	  courts	  have	  fallen	  all	  over	  the	  map	  in	  their	  attempts	  to	  square	   the	   two	   lines	  of	  precedent.	   	  At	   least	   three	  courts	  have	  applied	  
Foster’s	   unrestrained	   “essentially	   the	   same”	   test,	   though	   each	   for	   a	  different	   reason.	   	   One	   district	   court	   recognized	   that	   the	   conflict	   be-­‐tween	  the	   two	   lines	  of	  cases	   is	   irreconcilable,	  and	  rested	  on	  Foster	  as	  the	   earlier	   authority.120	   	   Another	   simply	   applied	   the	   “essentially	   the	  same”	   test	  without	  mentioning	  Aspex	   at	   all.121	   	  A	   third	   acknowledged	  
Aspex’s	   existence	  but	  distinguished	   it	  based	  on	   its	   reasoning.122	   	  Only	  one	   court	   followed	   Aspex	   in	   restricting	   claim	   preclusion	   to	   products	  that	  existed	  as	  of	  the	  prior	  judgment,	  by	  concluding	  that	  the	  “essential-­‐ly	  the	  same”	  test	  is	  actually	  an	  issue	  preclusion	  doctrine.123	  	  An	  en	  banc	  opinion	  is	  needed	  not	  only	  to	  replace	  the	  Foster	  rule	  with	  the	  more	  just	  
Aspex/Brain	  Life	  rule,	  but	  also	  to	  provide	  clear	  guidance	  to	  the	  district	  courts.	  The	   courts	  of	   appeals	  disfavor	  hearing	   an	   appeal	   en	  banc,	   either	  initially	  or	  after	  a	  panel	  has	  issued	  an	  opinion,	  unless	  doing	  so	  “is	  nec-­‐essary	  to	  secure	  or	  maintain	  uniformity	  of	  the	  court’s	  decisions,”	  or	  the	  appeal	   presents	   “a	   question	   of	   exceptional	   importance.”124	   	   A	   court	  may	  grant	  rehearing	  on	  a	  party’s	  petition	  or	  may	  do	  so	  sua	  sponte.125	  	  The	   Federal	   Circuit	   in	   particular	   has	   shown	   itself	  willing	   to	   hear	   ap-­‐	  	   120.	   	  Mentor	  Graphics	  Corp.	  v.	  EVE-­‐USA,	  No.	  10-­‐954,	  2014	  WL	  2533336,	  at	  *1	  (D.	  Or.	  June	  4,	  2014)	  (“[b]ecause	  one	  three-­‐judge	  panel	  cannot	  overrule	  another,	  Foster	  controls	  until	  the	  Feder-­‐al	  Circuit	  sitting	  en	  banc	  says	  otherwise.”)	  (internal	  citation	  omitted).	  	   121.	   	  See	  Multimedia	  Patent	  Trust	  v.	  LG	  Elecs.,	  Inc.,	  No.	  12-­‐2731,	  2013	  WL	  5779645,	  at	  *9	  (S.D.	  Cal.	  Aug.	  1,	  2013)	  (reasoning	  that	  “the	  only	  issue	  .	  .	  .	  is	  whether	  there	  are	  material	  differences	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  infringement	  between	  the	  accused	  products	  in	  this	  action	  and	  the	  accused	  prod-­‐ucts	  in	  the	  prior	  action”).	  	   122.	   	  Senju	  Pharm.	  Co.,	  Ltd.	  v.	  Apotex,	  891	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  656,	  660,	  662	  n.5	  (D.	  Del.	  2012)	  (citing	  
Nystrom,	  Acumed,	  and	  Foster	   favorably	   for	   the	  “essentially	   the	  same”	  test	  and	  asserting	  that	   the	  Federal	  Circuit’s	  opinion	   in	  Aspex	   “was	  based	  on	   that	  Court’s	   finding	   that	   the	  products	   at	   issue	  were	  different	  than	  in	  the	  first	   litigation”),	  aff’d	  by	  746	  F.3d	  1344	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2014).	   	  Much	  of	  the	  district	  court’s	  opinion,	  and	  the	  Federal	  Circuit	  opinion	  affirming	  it,	  concerned	  the	  effect	  of	  reex-­‐amination	   on	   claim	   preclusion.	   	   891	   F.	   Supp.	   2d	   at	   661–62;	   746	   F.3d	   at	   1352–53.	   	   In	   fact,	   the	  reviewing	   court	   expressly	   limited	   its	   analysis	   to	   the	   reexamination	  question,	   and	   expressly	  de-­‐clined	  to	  address	  arguments	  premised	  on	  Aspex’s	  holding	  on	  the	  scope	  of	  claim	  preclusion.	   	  746	  F.3d	  at	  1351.	  	   123.	   	  See	  Pet	  Prod.	  Innovations,	  LLC	  v.	  Paw	  Wash,	  L.L.C.,	  No.	  11-­‐7182,	  2012	  WL	  4461765,	  at	  *5	   (N.D.	   Ill.	   Sept.	  25,	  2012)	   (reasoning	  based	  on	  Aspex	   that	  a	  prior	   suit	  between	   the	  parties	   re-­‐solved	   the	   issue	   of	  whether	   the	  presently	   accused	  products	  were	   the	   same	   as	   the	   formerly	   ac-­‐cused	  products).	  	   124.	   	  Fed.	  R.	  App.	  P.	  35(a)(1),	  (2).	  	  	  	   125.	   	  Fed.	  R.	  App.	  P.	  35(a),	  (b);	  United	  States	  v.	  Grumman	  Aerospace	  Corp.,	  927	  F.2d	  575,	  581	  n.1	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  1991)	  (Plager,	  J.,	  dissenting	  from	  refusal	  to	  hear	  appeal	  en	  banc).	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  banc	  on	  its	  own	  initiative.126	   	  Whether	  or	  not	  the	  conflict	  be-­‐tween	   Foster	   and	   Aspex/Brain	   Life	   is	   “a	   question	   of	   exceptional	   im-­‐portance,”	  it	  certainly	  demonstrates	  that	  an	  en	  banc	  opinion	  is	  needed	  to	  “secure	  .	  .	  .	  uniformity	  of	  the	  court’s	  decisions.”	   	  The	  Federal	  Circuit	  should	  order	  an	  en	  banc	  hearing	  or	  rehearing	  when	  an	  appeal	  presents	  the	   opportunity,	   and	   install	   the	  Aspex/Brain	   Life	   rule	   as	   the	   law	   gov-­‐erning	  claim	  preclusion	  in	  patent	  infringement	  cases.	  CONCLUSION	  In	  Aspex	  and	  Brain	  Life,	  the	  Federal	  Circuit	  has	  attempted	  admira-­‐bly	   to	   correct	   an	  unfortunate	   consequence	  of	  Foster’s	   “essentially	   the	  same”	  test.	  	  Because	  three-­‐judge	  panels	  issued	  both	  opinions,	  however,	  the	   attempt	   so	   far	  must	   be	   regarded	   a	   failure.	   	   The	   full	   court	   should	  seize	   the	  next	  opportunity	   to	  visit	   the	  question	  en	  banc	  and	  clean	  up	  the	  mess.	  And	  a	  mess	  it	  is.	  	  That	  Aspex	  and	  Foster	  are	  in	  conflict	  is	  apparent.	  	  
Foster	   established	   that	   successive	   claims	   of	   infringement	   of	   a	   patent	  are	   barred	   if	   the	   successively	   accused	   products	   are	   “essentially	   the	  same,”	  whether	   or	   not	   the	   later	   accused	   products	   postdate	   the	   prior	  judgment.	   	   By	   contrast,	   the	   Aspex	   court	   held	   that	   a	   judgment	   of	   in-­‐fringement	   never	   bars	   suit	   against	   products	   that	   were	   not	   made	   or	  sold	  as	  of	   the	  prior	   judgment,	   “essentially	   the	  same”	  or	  not.	   	  The	   two	  holdings	   are	   squarely	   in	   conflict,	   obliging	   district	   courts	   to	   favor	   the	  one	  that	  came	  first:	  Foster.	  Both	   the	   Aspex	   and	   Brain	   Life	   courts	   reasoned	   as	   though	   their	  opinions	   were	   perfectly	   compatible	   with	   Foster,	   but	   their	   reasoning	  does	  not	  withstand	  scrutiny.	   	  The	  Federal	  Circuit	  did	  not	  depart	   from	  long-­‐established	   claim	  preclusion	  principles	   in	  Foster,	   but	  merely	  de-­‐fined	  what	  makes	   up	   a	   “claim”	   in	   a	   patent	   infringement	   action.	   	   The	  opinions	   in	   the	   Foster	   line	   applied	   the	   “essentially	   the	   same”	   test	   to	  each	   accused	   product	   in	   a	   subsequent	   action,	   not	   merely	   those	   that	  could	   have	   been	   accused	   of	   infringement	   before	   the	   prior	   judgment.	  	  Finally,	   the	   Federal	   Circuit’s	   application	   of	   the	   “essentially	   the	   same”	  test	   has	   not	   been	   limited	   to	   circumstances	   in	   which	   issue	   prelusion	  would	   bar	   a	   subsequent	   infringement	   claim.	   	   The	   conflict	   between	  
	  	   126.	   	  See	  Ryan	  Vacca,	  Acting	   Like	   an	  Administrative	  Agency:	   The	   Federal	   Circuit	   En	  Banc,	   76	  MO.	  L.	  REV.	  733,	  739	  (2011)	  (calculating	  that,	  of	  the	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  Federal	  Circuit	  has	  ordered	  an	  en	  banc	  hearing,	  it	  did	  so	  sua	  sponte	  in	  nearly	  half	  of	  them).	   	  Because	  of	  this	  high	  rate	  of	  sua	  sponte	  en	  banc	  hearings,	  the	  court	  has	  been	  accused	  of	  “establish[ing]	  broad	  patent	  rules	  on	  its	  own	  initiative	  and	  act[ing]	  more	  like	  a	  policymaker	  than	  an	  adjudicator.”	  	  Id.	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Aspex	   and	  Foster	   is	   real,	   and	  only	   the	   en	  banc	  Federal	  Circuit	   can	   re-­‐solve	  it.	  When	   it	   takes	   the	   question	   up,	   the	   en	   banc	   court	   should	   favor	  
Aspex	  over	  Foster.	   	  In	  defining	  a	  “claim”	  of	  patent	  infringement	  to	  em-­‐brace	   only	   acts	   of	   infringement	   that	   occurred	   while	   the	   prior	   action	  was	  pending,	  Aspex	  prevents	  a	  judgment	  of	  infringement	  from	  becom-­‐ing	  a	  perpetual	   license	   to	   infringe.	   	  Other	  doctrines	  will	   fill	   the	  open-­‐ings	  left	  by	  Foster’s	  absence.	  	  Courts	  can	  invoke	  the	  Kessler	  doctrine	  to	  protect	   adjudged	   noninfringers	   from	   harassing	   litigation,	   and	   issue	  preclusion	  will	  likely	  prevent	  successive	  declaratory	  judgment	  actions	  by	   adjudged	   infringers.	   	   In	   short,	   overruling	   Foster	   in	   favor	   of	  Aspex	  will	  preserve	  Foster’s	  benefits	  and	  eliminate	  its	  disadvantages,	  leading	  to	  more	  just	  results	  overall.	  Whatever	  the	  advantages	  of	  the	  Aspex/Brain	  Life	  rule,	  the	  current	  state	  of	  the	  case	  law	  prevents	  parties	  from	  realizing	  them.	  	  “[W]hether	  it	   proceeds	   upon	   good	   reasons	   or	   upon	   bad	   reasons,	  whether	   it	  was	  right	  or	  wrong,”127	  Foster	  remains	  the	  law.	  	  It	  falls	  to	  the	  Federal	  Circuit	  to	  change	  that.	  	  
	  	   127.	   	  Kessler	  v.	  Eldred,	  206	  U.S.	  285,	  288	  (1907).	  
